Morgan's canon is not evidence by Samuel, Steven & Clayton, Nicola
AUTHORS’ VERSION (SUBJECT TO FINAL EDITS) 




AUTHORS: SAMUEL, STEVEN & CLAYTON, NICOLA. 
 
1. Johannes Mahr, Gergely Csibra. 
2. Abstract: 60, Main Text: 996, References: 432, Total: 1517 
3. Morgan’s Canon is not evidence. 
4. Samuel, Steven and Clayton, Nicola 
5. University of Cambridge, UK. 
6. Department of Psychology, Downing Street, University of Cambridge, CB2 3EB 
7. Tel: 01223 333563 
8. Email: Steven Samuel – ss2391@cam.ac.uk; Nicola Clayton – nsc22@cam.ac.uk 
9. N/A 
10. Abstract. Mahr and Csibra’s account of the communicative function of episodic memory 
relies more heavily on the case against episodic memory in nonhumans than their description 
suggests. Although the communicative function of episodic memory may be accurate as it 
pertains to human behaviour, we question whether Morgan’s Canon is a suitable foundation 
on which to build theories of supposedly human-specific traits. 
 
11. Main text. 
Mahr and Csibra’s account rests in part on the literature on human cognition but stands full 
weight upon Morgan’s Canon – namely that in non-human behaviour it is to the simplest 
levels of explanation that we must first appeal. Our approach is not to argue that the authors’ 
thesis is wrong. However, Morgan’s Canon does not permit a rejection outright of higher 
cognitive processes in other species, because it is not evidence. Therefore, the unfalsifiability 
of Mahr and Csibra’s account correlates perfectly with the ‘provability’ of the presence of 
episodic memory in non-linguistic species. The Canon is at best a sort of subjective (and 
likely anthropocentric) ‘Bayesian prior’, with a theoretically tenuous default setting of zero. 
We briefly present the case against zero, and for reasons of space focus on only two species: 
scrub jays and rhesus monkeys. 
 
Mahr and Csibra’s definitions of episodic memory and autonoesis are intrinsically human-
specific, so we adopt a broad, ‘traditional’ definition of episodic memory as the integrated 
knowledge of what, where and when (‘WWW’) something occurred, coupled with a sense of 
recollection or re-experience (autonoesis) when accessing this information. The authors 
redefine autonoesis somewhat more specifically than this, as an outcome of the 
metarepresentation of a scenario under the ‘epistemic attitude of remembering’. We thus 
briefly examine evidence for WWW memory and the metarepresentation of memory, the 
latter being as close as empirical research on nonhumans can presently get to the authors’ 
own definition, and invite the reader to draw their own conclusion. 
 
WWW memory has been observed in a number of species (see Cheke & Clayton, 2010, for a 
review), but it is in scrub jays that it has been most thoroughly examined. Jays selectively 
recovered cached food according to when they had cached (i.e. if too long a time has passed, 
the worms have perished but the peanuts are fine), what it was (worms are tastier than 
peanuts, given the choice) and where they had buried it (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998, 1999b). 
Moreover, they can flexibly adapt to recover food types they have not recently been fed to 
satiety on (Clayton & Dickinson, 1999a), show flexible awareness of the rate at which 
different food types decline in freshness (Clayton, Yu & Dickinson, 2001) or improve as they 
‘ripen’ (de Kort, Dickinson & Clayton, 2005), can update their information about cached 
foods even between caching and recovery (Clayton, Yu & Dickinson, 2003), show awareness 
of which individuals may have been watching them while they cached (Dally, Emery & 
Clayton, 2006), and can dissociate the location of specific food from other, less preferred 
food in the same container (Clayton & Dickinson, 1999b). Clayton and her colleagues, 
mindful of the autonoetic component of episodic memory that only language-users can 
realistically convey, termed this ‘episodic-like’ memory (see also Clayton & Russell, 2009). 
Overall, this pattern of results suggests the jays form an integrated and cognitively rich 
WWW memory (de Kort et al., 2005). Moreover, this memory is grounded in the jay’s own 
agentive experience. This need not be a trivial point – the ability to judge a signal as 
unreliable, even from a conspecific (e.g. Cheney & Seyfarth, 1988), suggests there is 
theoretical utility in retaining some aspect of the self as the source of information. 
 
Secondly, there is also by now a substantial body of evidence suggesting nonhumans can 
metarepresent their own memory - essentially ‘know what they remember’. Rhesus monkeys 
are the species for which the greatest amount of evidence is available. For example, in 
delayed matching-to-sample tests, the subject is presented with a stimulus to remember and 
then given a multiple-choice memory task after an intervening delay. The subject is either 
forced to take the test, or given the opportunity to ‘opt out’ before doing so. Rhesus monkeys 
show evidence of greater accuracy on memory tests they chose to take than on memory tests 
that were forced (Hampton, 2001), and are more likely to ‘bet’ more on tests they are about to 
answer correctly, or feel they have already answered correctly (Morgan, Kornell, Kornblum 
& Terrace, 2014), suggesting that they could assess their own memories, even in the absence 
of the stimuli themselves, and choose to take tests when their confidence was relatively high. 
In another task, rhesus monkeys were presented with a number of tubes and either witnessed 
one of them being baited with food, or had no knowledge of which tube the food was in. The 
monkeys were more likely to look into the tubes first when they had no memory of where the 
food was than when they had seen the baiting, indicating that they ‘knew when they didn’t 
know’ (Basile, Schroeder, Brown, Templer & Hampton, 2015; Templer & Hampton, 2012; 
See also Hampton & Hampstead, 2006). Moreover, these apparently metacognitive 
judgments have been shown to transfer across different tasks, lending weight to the argument 
that they are cognitively independent of associative learning and stimulus- or task-specific 
factors (Kornell, Son & Terrace, 2007; Morgan et al., 2014). 
 
Crucially, we do not claim that nonhuman animals must have episodic memory, or 
metamemory (Hampton, 2009), and we retain that the authors’ central argument may be 
correct, particularly as it pertains to humans, and may furthermore be testable. For example, 
in English we can make the distinction between the episodic past (e.g. ‘I remember posting 
the letter’) versus non-episodic past (e.g. ‘I remembered to post the letter’). One possible test 
of the authors’ account could involve asking which sentence was more ‘ill-willed’ when the 
participant knew the speaker was lying. Insofar as we may tie our reputations to the mast of 
our epistemic authority, we suspect the majority would be particularly irked by the invocation 
of specifically episodic rather than semantic memory in ‘I remember posting…’. However, 
the validity of the human story rests on the invalidity of the nonhuman one. Whether we 
should begin to look in more detail at the crux of the Mahr and Csibra’s profoundly human 
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